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The new practice is not designed for the benefit of the legal profession, but it is expected that it will redound to their advantage. It
has not been framed for the purpose of increasing the power of the
judges of the state, although it vests a wider discretion in them with
respect to procedure, but, on the contrary, it will prevent them from
shifting the responsibility for any technical decisions on mere matters of practice. Its purpose is to make the administration of
justice more speedy, more certain and less expensive and thus advance
the interests of the entire people of the state. 2
'Chairman of the Board of Statutory Consolidation of the state of New York.

The Board of Statutory Consolidation of the state of New York was created
by chapter 664 of the laws of 1904. The original board consisted of Adolph J.
Rodenbeck, John G. Milburn, William B. Hornblower, Judson S. Landon and
Charles Andrews. Judge Andrews did not qualify and Adelbert Moot was appointed in his place. Judge Landon died and the remaining members of the
board prepared a consolidation of the general statutes of the state and a statutory
record of the general statutes and also of the special, private and local statutes.
Mr. Hornblower was appointed a judge of the court of appeals and resigned from
the board and Charles A. Collin was appointed in his place. The board as thus
constituted prepared a report on a plan for the simplification of the civil practice
in the courts and a report carrying out this plan was presented to the legislature
of 1915, pursuant to chapter 713 of the laws of 1913. This report of the board
is now being considered by a joint committee of the legislature and by committees
of 2the various bar associations of the state.
It is not possible within the limits of this article to illustrate the new practice
by extensive abstracts from the Civil Practice Act and Civil Practice Rules.
Those who desire to make a closer study of the subject are referred to the report
of the Board of Statutory Consolidation, in three volumes, transmitted to the
legislature of the state of New York, April 21, 1915. The two following provisions
from the Civil Practice Act are inserted here merely as illustrative of the extent
to which the board has gone in order to secure a prompt and efficient determination of legal controversies:
"A person claiming to be interested under a deed, will or other written instrument, or in the enforcement of a statute or municipal ordinance, may apply to
the supreme court or a judge thereof by 'summons to appear' for the determination of any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument,
statute or ordinance, and for a declaration of the rights of the persons interested.
The court or a judge may direct such persons to be served with the summons
as may seem necessary. The application shall be supported by such evidence
as the court or judge may require. The court or judge shall not be bound to
determine any such question of construction if it ought not to be determined in

such manner."

(Civil Practice Act, § 57).

"Parties may submit to a trial court or judge having jurisdiction of the subject
in controversy a matter in difference between them in person or by attorney upon
oral or written pleadings or statements to be tried by the court or set down for
trial before a referee or arbitrator or before a jury under such procedure as to
evidence and appeal and otherwise as "may be agreed upon." (id., § 58).
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There is no part of the community that will not be benefited by
this reform. All classes are affected by the character of the courts
and the performance of the duties vested in them. Justice has been
described as the greatest concern of man. Without it this state and
this nation would not long endure. When justice fails, the confidence
and respect of the people for the government vanishes and a spirit
of anarchy must follow a feeling of disrespect and lack of confidence.
It has been said that a nation is as strong as the faith of its citizens
in its courts and that its character is to be judged by the manner of
the enforcement of its laws.
Take away the administration of justice in the courts and you
remove the very foundations of government. It is the balancewheel that controls and governs the other departments. This was
well recognized by the framers of our constitutions. The function
of our courts in the interpretation of constitutions and statutes is
pointed to as the distinguishing feature of the American government
and the main source of its strength. Checks and balances have been
imposed upon the operations of other departments and the courts
have been placed above them as an umpire to see that those limitations are not exceeded. The genius of the framers of the federal
constitution would have gone for naught but for the wisdom of the
great lawyers and the great judges who interpreted that document.
It was the spirit of their interpretation which gave it life. Without their genius it would have been as rigid as the dry bones of the
human body. They gave it virility and made it a living thing by
adjusting it from time to time to new conditions without which it
would have been a mere scrap of paper.
It is in the courts and in the procedure in the courts that the hope
of the future lies. Physical violence between the citizens of a state
is obviated by the establishment of courts for the administration of
justice, backed by adequate authority for the enforcement of their
judgments, and international disputes will likewise come to an end
when there shall be established an international tribunal with power
enough back of it to enforce its decrees. Without such an international court irreconcilable controversies must be settled by force
of arms and the breaking down of the faith of the people in municipal courts is but a step toward arbitration and finally to war
itself. How important it is, therefore, for all, laymen as well
as lawyers, to see that the courts are made the true ministers of
justice.
This subject has played a most conspicuous part in the history
of all. peoples. Their progress toward a higher civilization may be
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traced in the history of their procedure for the administration of
justice. As we look back upon the early periods of jurisprudence
it seems to us impossible that any people could have administered
justice according to the crude methods formerly employed and we
wonder at the time that it has taken to throw off the old ideas and
to reach the present stage of development which advanced students
of jurisprudence believe will be succeeded in its turn by more simple
and more certain methods of procedure.
In this state we adopted the common law procedure of England.
There was nothing else to do. Even the genius of the framers of our
state government was not equal to the creation of a new procedure.
They accepted what they were accustomed to and endeavored to
adjust it to the atmosphere of the new institutions which they had
erected. It was soon found to be cumbersome, technical and unwieldy and, inspired by a great genius, a new procedure was enacted
by statute after more than fifty years of experience with the common
law procedure.3
This code did not cover the entire field, leaving many matters
still regulated by other statutes of the state, and in 1876 and again in
1880 statutes were passed which sought to bring within the covers
of a single book all of the general procedure in the courts of the state. 4
The material was not systematically arranged and committed the
fundamental error of combining substantive law and adjective law
in the same provisions. Criticisms which were made at the time
of its adoption have continued since with increasing volume until
there is now a general demand that the procedure of our courts
should be simplified and adjusted to the conditions of modern
life.
The state has gone through its common law period of procedure,
its mixed common law and statutory period and its statutory period
of code ,procedure. It now stands at the threshold of a new procedure under which a wider discretion shall be vested in the courts
over the details of procedure, leaving them to direct their attention
almost exclusively to the substantive rights of the parties. There
has been a general drift toward this method of procedure not only
in this state but elsewhere. While the state of New York set the
3
The Code of Procedure was enacted in 1848 (ch. 379) and consisted of 391 sections.
It is known as the Field Code, after its chief author, David Dudley Field.
4

The first thirteen chapters of the Code of Civil Procedure were enacted in

1876 (ch. 448) and the remaining chapters, fourteen to twenty-two, in 1880
(ch. 178). The additional chapter and articles have been added since that time,
so that in 1909 before the removal of any of its sections by the Board of Statutory
Consolidation it contained 3384 sections.
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pace for judicial reform in the middle of the last century, it took a
backward step in the latter half of that century and it has since been
outstripped by other jurisdictions.
An advance has been made along the line of subordinating procedural rights to substantive rights. It is not more than a century
ago that the distinction was first emphasized between substantive
and adjective law, the latter being regarded as a right as important
as the former. It was only with the lapse of time that procedure was
recognized as a mere method for determining the substantive right.
In recognition of this idea, in many jurisdictions procedure is now
regulated by the courts and not by the legislature. Rules of court
have superseded and are superseding rules of the legislature. This
change in the system of procedure was largely due to the recognition
of the subordinate character of adjective law and to the rigidity of
procedure regulated by statute.
Where the procedure is regulated by statute the courts are powerless to deviate from the rules thus laid down and the procedure must
necessarily become a matter of right. That system also enables
the courts to avoid coming to the merits of a controversy and is productive of delays by multiplying adjudications upon matters of
procedure. It is easier to decide questions of procedure than to pass
upon the rights of the parties. It is for these reasons that we have
had so much procedural law under the present system of statutory
regulation of procedure. The system of statutory rules also encourages a resort to other means for deciding controversies between
citizens. The growth of committees and boards of arbitration are
an evidence of the insufficiency of the courts and a protest against the
existing court procedure.
It seems imperative that some reform should be made, not alone
in the interest of the bench and bar, but in the interest of those who
have the occasion to resort to the courts for the enforcement of their
substantive rights. In bringing about such a reform in this state
the code of civil procedure occupies the center of the stage. In
common law states the adoption of a statute on the subject of procedure may bring about the necessary reform. Not so in this state
where the practice is regulated substantially by the code of civil
procedure.
The placing of plasters and bandages here and there on the code
of civil procedure will not remedy the disease. Some more radical
treatment is necessary. In the first place a surgical operation must
be performed, consisting of the removal of the substantive law which
all students of procedure admit has no place in a code of procedure.
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This idea did not always prevail, but it has come to be recognized as
one of the first rules of judicial reform. The separation, however,
of the substantive law from the code of civil procedure would leave
that statute an unrecognizable conglomeration of disjointed provisions. The removal of the substantive law would require a rearrangement of the adjective law and such a rearrangement by bringing
together related provisions, would emphasize the inharmonious
character of those provisions and make necessary a consolidation.
After this operation had been performed there would still remain a
body of fixed statutory rules illy adapted to the speedy enforcement
of legal rights. The board removed the substantive law from the
code and attempted to consolidate and arrange the remaining provisions according to a logical classification, but soon reached the
conclusion that this change was inadequate to bring about the reform
in procedure that was necessary to make the courts an effective
instrument for the adjudication of legal controversies. 5
The first step that was regarded as necessary was the substitution of rules of court in place of rules of the legislature and the underlying principle of this change is that of flexibility in procedure. 6
This flexibility is accomplished by vesting in the courts control of
procedure-not an absolute control but a limited control-limited by
the constitution and by the legislature. This is not an extraordinary
power, since the courts now possess the authority to make rules of
court. It is merely the adjustment of the regulation of procedure by
placing the control of the details of procedure in the courts, subject to
regulation as to jurisdictional and fundamental matters by the legislature. Under the proposed change the people still control the procedure of the courts through the legislature, but power is delegated
to the courts to adopt rules to regulate the details of procedure. The
constitution, the legislature and the courts all have a hand now in
5

The Board of Statutory Consolidation having removed substantive provisions from the Code of Civil Procedure, prepared a rearrangement of the
remaining provisions of the Code according to the steps in the progress of an
action. This rearrangement was printed but it was found to be impracticable
to use it as a basis for the preparation of the rules of court, except for the suggestions
that the provisions contained.
6
"The procedure in the courts governed by this act shall be according to this
act and rules of court to be made and modified from time as herein provided;
and in cases where no provision is made by a statute or by rules the proceedings
shall be regulated by the court or judge before whom the matter is pending."
(Civil Practice Act, § 5).
"Non-compliance with any of the Civil Practice Rules, or with any rule of
practice for the time being in force, shall not render any proceedings void unless
the court or a judge shall so direct, but such proceedings may be set aside either
wholly or in part as irregular, or amended, or otherwise dealt with in such manner and upon such terms as the court or judge shall think fit." (id., § 8).
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regulating procedure, the controlling authority being in the constitution, the dominating power being in the legislature and the least
jurisdiction being in the courts. The proposed system changes this
distribution by delegating to the courts the power to regulate the
details of procedure, subject to constitutional and statutory restrictions.
It is not always easy to draw the line between those provisions
that should be left to the courts for regulation and those that should
be left to the legislature. There is a "twilight zone" which is hard
to define. Nevertheless, there are abundant provisions which it is
an easy matter to distribute to one of these two departments.
The doubtful cases must be determined by reference to the state
and federal constitutions guaranteeing certain procedure. Every
citizen, for instance, is entitled to the right to trial by jury in certain
cases of which he cannot be deprived either by the legislature or by the
courts. So, too, the federal constitution guarantees to every citizen
that he shall not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law. This means that the court must have jurisdiction
of the subject matter, 7 the parties must have a reasonable legal notice
with a reasonable opportunity to be heard8 and the judgment must
be confined to the issues presented by the parties.0 These principles
control the procedure in all the states. Where they are present
other matters are subordinate and may well be regulated by the
courts and be subject to modification as the interests of justice
require. Under the new practice, however, the courts are further
controlled by all statutory enactments both substantive and adjective.
The consolidated laws contain substantive and adjective law binding
upon the courts and the proposed civil practice act especially gives
direction to and controls the body of the law by procedure. Thus
it will be seen that, while a flexibility is obtained by the establishment
of rules of court, the courts are not given an absolute, unlimited and
unrestricted control, but are made subject upon jurisdictional and
fundamental matters to both the statutes of the state and to the state
and federal constitutions. This principle of flexibility obtained by
regulating procedure by rules of court is one which is in force in other
jurisdictions and is a distinct advance in the development of procedure, which can be traced in the history of the administration of
7

v. McNeil, 154 U. S. 34.
Neff, 95 U. S. 714; Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398; Windsor v.
93 U. S. 274.
McVeigh,
9
Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254.
8 Scott

Pennoyer v.
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justice, just as our present methods of procedure are an advance
upon former methods which recognized trial by wager, trial by battle
and other antique forms which are now looked upon as absurd relics
of a worn-out and discarded procedure.
The application, however, of the principle of flexibility of procedure
will not alone produce the complete reform that is demanded. A
procedure may be flexible and yet it may be as diverse as was the
common law procedure. That procedure was regulated by the courts
but it was not by stated rules of courts, as is proposed by the new
system. That practice was embalmed in the decisions of the courts
and, like the common law bearing upon substantive rights, it was
hard to find and varied with each particular case. Under the proposed system, while the stated rules will not control the courts, they
will be expressed in terms binding upon the courts, except where a
variance is necessary in the interest of justice. The diversity of
the common law procedure must be avoided and this is accomplished
by the application of the principle of uniformity of procedure.' 0
This principle, like that of flexibility, is a dominant characteristic of the new procedure. Under the code there are provisions applicable to actions generally, those applicable to special
actions and there are special proceedings which conform to the
provisions applicable to neither of the foregoing.
Under the new practice there will be but one form of action."1
Such special proceedings as are now found in the code will be changed
into the form of actions, that is, the relief now obtainable by special
proceedings will be obtained thereafter by a procedure similar to
that which governs an ordinary action. When the practitioner
has learned the procedire applicable to one action he has acquired
a knowledge of the procedure in all actions. The procedure under
the new practice for the enforcement of any right is the same. It
is commenced by a summons followed by a complaint and such
necessary reply or subsequent pleading as the case or the court may
require.
10"The practice in the courts shall be made as uniform as possible, and general
provisions applicable to more than one step in an action shall be broad and
liberal in terms, shall omit minute details, contain as few exceptions as possible

and leave as wide a discretion in the courts as practicable." (Civil Practice Act,

§ 9).
1"There shall be but one form of civil action under this act in all the courts
subject to this act which shall be called an 'action' but this provision shall not
apply to proceedings otherwise specially regulated by other statutes which shall
be called 'special proceedings.'" (Civil Practice Act, § 4).
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The same principle of uniformity has been applied to the rules
relating to joinder of parties. 2 It is often a perplexing question
to know what parties to join as plaintiff or defendant in an action.
That complication has been removed by the new practice. All
parties may be joined in favor of or against whom any relief is sought,
whether they be severally or jointly liable and, where there is a
doubt as to the liability, even in the alternative. No action can fail
for defect of parties. Where a party has been improperly joined,
he may be relieved upon motion and where a separate trial of any
interest is necessary such a trial may be had.
The same rule has been applied to the subject of joinder of causes
of action. 13 Any cause of action may be joined with any other cause
of action. Under the new practice no action can fail because causes
of action have been joined which cannot be tried conveniently
together. Where such a situation arises, separate trials may be had
upon motion but the joinder of causes of action cannot, as now, become the subject substantially of an independent litigation over procedural rights.
One motion for preliminary relief has been provided. 14 This
idea is the one that is so conspicuous in the English practice. Subse12 "The joinder of all parties plaintiff and defendant claiming an interest in
the subject of the action, whether jointly, severally or in the alternatives, shall
be permitted subject to an order for a separate trial as to any party and to suitable
penalties for misjoinder. The people of the state may be made a party defendant
in actions or proceedings affecting real property in which the people have an
interest." (Civil Practice Act, § 20).
"Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest,
but an executor,' guardian, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in
whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party expressly authorized by statute, may sue in his own name without joining with him
the party for whose benefit the action is brought; but, at any stage of the action,
any persons may be brought in as parties, either in addition to or in place of the
previously existing parties." (id., § 21).
"No action shall be defeated by the non-joinder or misjoinder of parties; but
new parties may be added and parties misjoined may be dropped, by order, at
any stage of the cause, as the ends of justice may require." (id., § 22).
"Where a complete determination cannot be had without the presence of other
parties, they shall be brought in and where a person, not a party, has an interest
or 13title which the judgment will affect, he shall be made a party." (id., § 23).
"All kinds of causes of action or counterclaims may be set up in the same
complaint or answer, subject to an order for a separate trial of any issue, where it
may be deemed expedient or necessary. No action or defence shall fail in whole
or in part because a party has an adequate remedy at law therefor; but the court
may grant such relief in law or equity, with or without a jury as the case and
justice may require." (Civil Practice Act, § 19).
' 4 "Suitable rules shall provide for the summary disposition of all matters of
procedure subsidiary to the actual controversy between the parties." (Civil
Practice Act, § 31).
"The general motion to determine the preliminary relief to which a party is
entitled before trial shall be made mandatory as to all such matters including
pleadings, parties, admissions, discovery, interrogatories, inspection, commissions,
examinations and place and mode of trial, subject to rules as to appeal and subsequent relief upon terms." (id., § 32).
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quent motions may be made for preliminary relief and may be granted
upon terms. The ensign, however, is to have all such applications
made at one time with one appeal from the order granting relief.
Under the present system each motion may assume the importance
of the main litigation and may delay the final determination in
complicated cases for an uncertain time. These matters being
regulated by statute, it is beyond the power of the courts to remedy
the evil. When the practice is placed under the control of the
courts, they must take the responsibility of seeing that the issues
between the parties are brought to a speedy hearing and that the
time of the courts is not consumed in controversies over mere matters
of procedure. The enforcement of a rule requiring all preliminary
relief to be obtained at one time will result in the settlement of
many matters by the attorneys themselves which are now the subject of numerous motions and appeals.
The rule of one trial so far as practicable has been incorporated in
the new practice. 15 One of the evils of the present system is the number of retrials that occur. So far as possible the new practice
encourages one trial of the facts in order to obviate a reversal upon
any question except the law. This is accomplished by encouraging
a resort to special verdicts so far as possible, reserving questions of
law to be applied to the facts as found and by discouraging reversals
where the substantial rights of the parties are not affected by alleged
errors on appeal. The right to a jury trial guaranteed by the constitution has been recognized, but provision has been made for a waiver
of such a trial and by requiring a demand therefor to be made.' 6 In
respect to jury trials this state has not only preserved that right as
it existed at the time of the adoption of the first constitution, but
has incorporated in subsequent constitutions the right given by
' 5 "Full power shall exist to make rules of practice for expediting the selection
of the jury and the rules of practice shall provide for the fullest opportunity at
the trial for getting at the real facts at issue; and the facts shall be determined
so far as practicable upon one trial." (Civil Practice Act, § 33).
"A cause shall be submitted to the jury in such a manner that another trial
of the same facts may be obviated so far as practicable." (id., § 38).
"With a view to determining finally upon one trial so far as practicable the
facts in a case and to avoid retrials of questions of fact so far as practicable,
special verdicts subject to rules shall be resorted to wherever the case warrants
such a course." (id., § 40).
16"The right to a jury trial as provided in the constitution is hereby recognized
but such right shall be exercised by a written demand therefor made within ten
days after the cause is at issue (or in a case where a summons to appear will
issue, on the return day thereof) ; and if not so made such right shall be deemed
to have been waived; but a jury trial may be had, by order, of any issue of fact,
notwithstanding such waiver, or a jury trial may be dispensed with by order,
in a case where the right to dispense with a jury trial now exists." (Civil
Practice Act, § 34).
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statute to a jury trial where it did not formerly exist. The modern
tendency is to eliminate jury trials, particularly in commercial cases
which will not survive delay. We cannot restrict this right by
statute, but we may avoid unnecessary delay in some cases by requiring the parties to make a seasonable demand as a preliminary to the
right to a trial by jury. The practice act of Toronto furnishes a
striking example of the most advanced position with respect to
jury trials, where it is provided substantially that except in a few
17
cases no jury trial shall be had except by direction of the court.
The provision requiring a demand to be made as a preliminary to a
right to trial by jury is merely incorporating into the practice in
the upper courts what is now the usual procedure in local courts
in cases involving small amounts, where expedition is the very.
essence of the controversy.
No
One course of appeal is the rule under the new practice.,
reasonable procedure could be devised which would obviate entirely
reversals and re-trials, but rules can be formulated which will reduce
the number of new trials. The inexperience, ignorance and indifference of the bench and bar where it exists cannot be corrected
by rules, but pitfalls and obstacles can be removed which will make
it easier to avoid error. One course of appeal is all that should be
17
See Judicature Act of Ontario, May 7, 1913, chapter 19, 3-4 George V.
§§ 853-61.
' "The rules of practice shall contain such provisions as may be practicable,
without impairing the right of a trial by jury, directing appellate courts to disregard on appeal, mistakes, irregularities and defects not affecting substantial
rights, and generally to determine the issues according to the right and substance of the case." (Civil Practice Act, § 47).
"The review of an intermediate decision in the nature of an interlocutory
judgment except by the consent of the court or judge granting the same, shall
be limited to appeal from the final judgment." (id., § 48).
"The appeal from a judgment shall present all the questions of fact and law
in the case which the court has jurisdiction to review without regard to whether
or not an appeal has been taken from the decision upon the motion for a new
trial." (id., § 49).
"The trial judge is authorized upon a motion for a new trial to direct such a
judgment, notwithstanding the verdict, as should have been entered in the action
at the time of the trial." (id., § 50).
"No judgment shall be reversed or new trial granted on the ground of misdirection, improper admission or exclusion of evidence, or error as to a matter of
pleading or procedure unless after examination of the whole case it shall appear
that a substantial right of a party was injuriously affected." (id., § 51).
"There shall be a retrial not of the whole case in every instance but only of the
questions with respect to which an error was committed, if separable. When a
new trial is ordered because the damages are excessive or inadequate, and for no
other reason, the verdict shall be set aside only in respect of damages and shall
stand good in all other respects." (id., § 52).
"In all cases where it can be done constitutionally the appellate courts may
receive further evidence, allow amendments of pleadings or process and adopt
any procedure not inconsistent with this act which it may deem necessary or
expedient for a full and final hearing and determination of the cause." (id., § 53).
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necessary in most cases. In the English jurisdiction new trials are
almost unknown and our procedure and theirs have a common
origin. By providing for one motion for all preliminary relief
before trial and one appeal except by leave from the order granting
or refusing such relief, the number of appeals in this branch of procedure will be very much reduced. Interlocutory judgments have
been abolished and with them go appeals from such judgments.
Their review is involved in the appeal from the judgment. There
exists in the present practice a provision for disregarding immaterial
errors, but the new practice emphasizes this matter and requires
all mistakes, defects and irregularities to be disregarded unless
they affect a substantial right of a party.
There is but one judgment in the new procedure. 19 All intermediate
relief is granted by order. So far as these orders are not reviewable
directly by appeal they are brought up on appeal from the judgment.
As the provisions for joinder of parties and joinder of causes of action
have been liberalized, so the court has been granted broader powers
with respect to the entry of judgment. Relief may be granted
for or against any party whether plaintiff or defendant, as the facts
may require. Summary judgment is provided for in commercial
and other cases and provision is made for a motion for judgment
where the defense is sham, frivolous or otherwise unfounded.
It was, however, not sufficient that the control of procedure should
be placed in the courts and that procedure should be made uniform.
Even such a procedure might be complex. The rules may be ambiguous. It is not only necessary that they should be uniform but that
they should be simple in their language and easily understood.
A body of simple forms for pleadings and other papers is therefore
10"The rules of practice shall provide for the prompt disposition of any frivolous

or sham defence, and for granting summary relief and for rendering judgment in

favor of a party as against any other party at any stage of the action, which will,
so far as practicable, dispose of the controversy between the parties." (Civil
Practice Act, § 41).
"Judgment may be given for or against one or more of several plaintiffs, and
for or against one or more of several defendants, and the ultimate rights of the
parties on each side as between themselves may be determined; and when a
cause of action is sustained in favor of or against only a part of the parties thereto,
judgment may be rendered in favor of or against such parties respectively at any
stage of the proceedings." (id., § 42).
"Judgment may be taken as to any part of a claim, and the action may proceed
as to the remainder, where a part of the answer or reply is struck out or the
answer or reply admits a part of a claim, leaving such part uncontested or in any
other case where such a course is in the interest of justice." (id., § 43).
"Wherever an answer is served in an action brought to recover a debt or
liquidated demand arising upon a contract express or implied, sealed or unsealed,
or upon a judgment for a stated sum, or, upon a statute, the practice shall pro-vide that the answer may be struck out and that judgment may be entered upon
motion and affidavit, as may be provided by rules of practice." (id., § 44).
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contemplated.2 0 These have not been drawn but they will form a
part of the new practice. They will not control the practitioner
but will merely serve as a guide and as models for him to follow.
While the rules of pleading have been modified by statute, the forms
still retain much of the formality and ambiguity of pleadings under
the common law. A logical arrangement of the rules also will
conduce to simplicity. The rules should be arranged according
to the progress of an action from its commencement to its close, with
a division comprising general rules applicable to one or more stages
of an action. 21 It is not enough to combine the procedure relating
to a given remedy, as for instance that relating to provisional remedies, within a single rule, but the rule must be drawn in language
which can be easily understood. The principle of simplicity, therefore, is one that has been followed by the board throughout its work.
This is manifest in the arrangement of the new consolidated laws
made up of substantive provisions taken from the code of civil
procedure. The alphabetical arrangement has been adopted merely
as a matter of simplicity and convenience. This arrangement
obviates the necessity of first determining under what head a given
subject has been classified. This cyclopaedic method is generally
recognized as most convenient where it can be applied and is the
one now commonly followed in extensive law treatises.
The plan of the board involves a disposition of the entire code of
civil procedure. If the new practice is adopted, the code will be repealed and in its place there will be a short practice act of about
seventy sections, a body of rules consisting of about four hundred
rules, an Evidence Law, a Costs, Fees, Disbursements and Interest
Laws and a Civil Right Law. Other substantive matter in the code
not contained in these three laws has been assigned to appropriate
existing consolidated laws where it can be found quite as readily as
other matters of similar character. The practice in the surrogate's
court and in the courts of justices of the peace, being special practice,
has not been changed, but each has been made a separate statute.
Under the new practice, when a practitioner has determined his cause
of action or his right to a specific relief, the procedure for the enforcement of that right or relief will be controlled by the civil practice rules
20

"There shall be prepared, as part of the rules, short forms for pleadings and
other papers generally used in court proceedings but no technical objection shall
be raised to any paper on the ground of any alleged want of form." (Civil
Practice
Act, § 25).
2
1"The civil practice rules shall be arranged according to a logical classification
following the steps in the progress of an action and so that the provisions upon
the same subject, so far as practicable, shall be found together." (Civil Practice
Act, § 17).
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and he will find in these rules a simple, uniform and flexible system
of procedure for arriving at a determination of the merits of his.
controversy.
The result of the new practice will be a shifting of the responsibility for the administration of justice from the legislature to the
courts. The judiciary will not be able to escape the responsibility
for maladministration of justice by charging it to fixed statutory rules
and will not be able to hide their defects behind technical constructions of statutes. The rights of the parties will be brought to the foreground and controversies over subordinate procedure will be relegated
to the background. It will stimulate the bench to a higher degree
of efficiency and will discourage the bar from interposing technical
objections which do not go to the substantial rights of the parties.
It will save the time of the appellate courts now consumed in reviewing questions of procedure and will conserve judicial time and energy.
The general result will be greater expedition, greater certainty and
less expense in the administration of justice, but this result will
depend to a large degree upon the character, qualifications and
spirit of the bench and bar and the attitude manifested toward the
new practice. In the last analysis it is a question of men after all.
The best procedure must fail if not properly administered.
The Board of Statutory Consolidation has done its part. It
has justified its existence. It has consolidated the general statutes
of the state and has prepared a statutory record of all the statutes
of the state, general, special, private and local. Six years ago it
prepared a re-classification of the material in the code of civil procedure. During the past two years it has devoted its attention
exclusively to the reform of the civil practice. It presented a plan
of this reform to the legislature and in pursuance of that plan it
now presents its report. The board invites serious attention to this
report and welcomes honest criticism designed to perfect its work.
It was not an easy task. It was not easy to distribute the substantive matter in the code to appropriate consolidated laws. The
distribution required time and reflection and was not entirely satisfactory when completed. The preparation of the new consolidated
laws was not done in a day. Above all, the examination of the
procedure in other jurisdictions and the suggestions made by those
who have written upon the subject of the reform of procedure required serious consideration. The preparation of the practice act
and rules was not a slight task. Having done its part the board
now appeals to the members of the bench and bar to do their
part.

THE CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
A great opportunity is presented. The reform of procedure is a
call to duty. It must be done by those learned in the law. This
is not an academic question to be used as a perennial topic of discussion at bar association meetings. It is a vital, practical public question that should receive the serious attention of every member of
the bar. It is second in importance to none so far as the security
of life and pi'operty and the protection of private and public rights
are concerned; and is on a par with the church itself as a living
force in the community for peace and order and good government.
The profession has the skill and training. It has the confidence of
the public. It is not the work of this board alone but of legislature and the rank and file of the profession. Though the people may
recognize the necessity for the reform, they are unable to accomplish
it as it should be done. If it is not worked out by those who are
able to do it, it will be brought about by the people through their
own crude methods. Already there is a resort to committees and
boards of arbitration for the settlement of disputes. The recall of
judges and of their decisions is a protest against the administration
of justice and an effort to accomplish a reform by tearing down rather
than by building up and supporting our system of government.
It is impossible to predict the results of a failure to improve the
administration of justice. This function of government is the very
life-blood of the political body. It equalizes rights and distributes
justice. Clog up this current and you paralyze the body politic.
It has been compared to the arteries of the human body, the hardening of which produces sure death. A failure to properly administer
justice first results in dissatisfaction and discontent, then in disrespect and contempt, then in a resort to committees and boards
of arbitration in the search for justice without law and finally perhaps
in anarchy with its accompanying freedom from all law. In the light
of recent events abroad this is not an extreme view. How fragile are
ancient and established institutions and governments and how slender
is the cord of civilization under the stress of powerful human emotions and resentment for real or fancied private or public wrongs!
Before it is too let let us reaffirm and exemplify by a suitable reform
of our procedure the principle wrung from King John on the plains
of Runnymede:
"To none will we deny, to none will we delay right or justice."

